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To understand the neural correlates of
expert object recognition, Harel et al.
(2013) proposed the use of an existing the-
oretical framework (Mahon et al., 2007;
Martin, 2007) that emphasizes the interac-
tion between different parts of the visual
pathway as well as between the visual
and other cognitive systems. While we
agree that focusing more on the role of
these interactions in expertise acquisition
is a fruitful research direction, we would
like to clarify the position of percep-
tual expertise researchers 1. In fact, per-
ceptual expertise researchers never regard
face-selective areas as the only neural
substrates important for expert object
recognition. Nor do they deny the role
of interaction between the visual sys-
tem and other cognitive systems. Instead,
perceptual expertise researchers have been
considering the interaction between per-
ceptual and cognitive processing as an
important component in understanding
perceptual expertise for different objects.
It is therefore unnecessary to create the
debate between the so-called “perceptual
view” and “interactive view” of expert
object recognition, as the interaction
between perceptual and cognitive process-
ing has been well accommodated in per-
ceptual expertise research.We elaborate on
this idea through the following two points:
1Here “perceptual expertise researchers” refer to those
who investigate perceptual expertise in object recog-
nition. To evaluate our interpretation of the position
taken by perceptual expertise researchers in general,
we encourage readers to refer to the papers we cited,
including mainly but not limited to the works of
researchers from the Perceptual Expertise Network
(PEN).
PERCEPTUAL EXPERTISE
RESEARCHERS DO EMPHASIZE THE
ROLE OF ATTENTIONAL AND
HIGHER-LEVEL COGNITIVE FACTORS IN
EXPERTISE ACQUISITION AND
EXPRESSION
Harel et al. (2013) states that according
to perceptual expertise researchers, “expert
processing. . . is automatic and stimulus-
driven, with little impact of attentional,
task demands or other higher-level cog-
nitive factors” (p.2). Unfortunately, this
characterization of the views of perceptual
expertise researchers is inaccurate. Palmeri
and Gauthier (2004), for example, pro-
poses the abandoning of the strict dis-
tinction between perceptual and cognitive
processes in understanding expert object
recognition. Bukach et al. (2006), another
landmark paper detailing the perceptual
expertise framework, affirms that there
are different kinds of perceptual expertise
for different objects, and to distinguish
between them both physical and concep-
tual (e.g., functional knowledge) proper-
ties should be considered.
Research has shown the importance of
task demands in the development as well
as expression of expertise in object recog-
nition. Task demand during training is
always a major factor determining whether
or what kind of expertise would be formed
(e.g., Tanaka et al., 2005; Scott et al.,
2006; Krigolson et al., 2009; Wong et al.,
2009a,b, 2012). Task demand during test-
ing also affects whether and how much
expertise effects can be observed (Wong
et al., 2009b, 2012, 2014). For example,
in Wong et al. (2009b), two groups of
observers learned to categorize the same
set of artificial objects (ziggerins) in dif-
ferent ways, leading to different changes of
neural selectivity patterns for the trained
objects. Importantly, the neural changes
were better observed when the testing
task matched the training task. Even the
FFA shows higher activity to different
objects in tasks that requires more atten-
tion such as old/new recognition than
passive viewing (Rhodes et al., 2004).
Therefore, using Harel et al.’s (2013) terms
(their footnote 2), both “task-specific
learning effects” and “task dependence
following expertise training” have been
well identified among perceptual expertise
researchers (see also Box 2 of Bukach et al.,
2006).
Perceptual expertise researchers put a
lot of emphasis on the engagement of
non-visual factors and the involvement of
visual and non-visual areas outside the
FFA (James and Gauthier, 2003, 2004,
2006; James and Atwood, 2009; James and
Cree, 2010; Wong and Gauthier, 2010a;
Bilalic´ et al., 2011a, 2010, 2012; Behrmann
and Plaut, 2013; Kersey and James, 2013).
For example, Wong and Gauthier (2010a)
found that expert perception of musi-
cal notes engages not only higher visual
regions that are distinct from the face- or
letter-selective regions, but also bilateral
early retinotopic cortex, and a wide range
of multimodal regions including audi-
tory, audiovisual, somatosensory, motor,
parietal, frontal, and various subcortical
areas. Similarly, a distributed network of
areas including the motor and inferior
frontal cortices is also engaged selectively
for visual judgments of letters (James and
Gauthier, 2006). A wide range of brain
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regions in the occipital, temporal, and
frontal regions has also been found to be
more active when chess experts performed
visual judgment of chess pieces on chess-
boards (Bilalic´ et al., 2010; JEPG).
Training studies also show clearly
the engagement of a widespread neu-
ral network of areas for expert object
processing. When comparing the neural
training effects of two traditions of visual
perceptual training protocols (namely
perceptual learning and perceptual exper-
tise training), a wide range of brain
regions has been investigated, includ-
ing the recruitment and disengagement
of early retinotopic cortex, higher visual
cortex, parietal cortex, and the superior
temporal sulcus (Wong et al., 2012). James
and Gauthier (2003, 2004) also found
that participants who verbally learned to
associate artificial objects with conceptual
features showed activations in non-visual
areas during subsequent, perceptual judg-
ment on these objects, including superior
temporal gyrus (hearing), inferior frontal
gyrus (semantics), etc.
Perceptual expertise researchers often
emphasize that experts tend to automati-
cally process their objects of expertise in a
certain way (e.g., holistically, at a subordi-
nate level of abstraction) or by recruiting
certain brain areas even without explicit
task instructions or requirements (e.g.,
Gauthier et al., 2000;Wong et al., 2009a,b).
Importantly, however, this does not mean
that such processes cannot be influenced
or even overridden by higher-level cog-
nitive processing 2. On the contrary, as
described above, both training studies and
studies with real-world expertise demon-
strate that cognitive processing (e.g., atten-
tion shaped by the current task demand,
multimodal integration, and semantics) is
often engaged even in tasks requiring only
perceptual judgments.
Furthermore, it has been postulated
that non-visual processing not only is
2Take as an example the composite task frequently
used to measure holistic processing in expert object
recognition (e.g., Richler et al., 2008; Wong and
Gauthier, 2010b; Wong et al., 2011). A typical
observer would spontaneously process all parts of an
object of expertise even though the task instruction
requires the observer to focus on one part, leading
to imperfect performance. However, the performance
is mostly well above chance, indicating that one can
override their natural tendency of holistic processing
at least to a certain extent to fulfill task requirement.
engaged but also plays a crucial role in
shaping neural selectivity for expert object
categories. For example, writing training
is found to be more effective than visual
practice in contributing to the formation
of letter selectivity in the fusiform gyrus,
indicating a close interaction between
motor and perceptual areas (James and
Atwood, 2009; Kersey and James, 2013).
Recently, Behrmann and Plaut (2013) pro-
pose that, the selective engagement of the
left and right fusiform gyri for word and
face processing respectively may originate
from the constraint to keep the connec-
tions between visual word processing areas
and language processing areas (both left-
lateralized) as short as possible. Therefore,
even when accounting for selectivity in
visual areas, a distributed network of brain
areas should be and have been considered.
EARLY PERCEPTUAL EXPERTISE
RESEARCH FOCUSES MORE ON THE
FACE-SELECTIVE AREAS IN ORDER TO
ADDRESS THE “FACE MODULARITY”
DEBATE, BUT THAT DOES NOT
NECESSITATE THAT RESEARCHERS
REGARD FACE-SELECTIVE AREAS AS
THE ONLY BRAIN REGIONS
IMPORTANT FOR EXPERT OBJECT
RECOGNITION
Despite the abundant research on the
interaction between visual and cognitive
processing in expert object recognition,
why may perceptual expertise researchers
be regarded as face-centric, as in Harel
et al. (2013; p.4)? It has to do with the “face
modularity debate” that heat up from the
late 90’s in the field of face perception.
The face modularity debate concerns
the nature of the fusiform face area (FFA)
in face processing: Is the FFA a mod-
ule specialized for face recognition, or is
it responsible for expert subordinate-level
recognition of any objects? As stated in
Bukach et al. (2006) and McGugin et al.
(2012), the degree to which FFA activ-
ity is exclusive for faces lies in the center
of the debate. In support of the latter
view, perceptual expertise researchers have
shown that acquisition of expertise with
various object categories (e.g., cars, birds,
“Digimon” cartoon characters, chess, and
artificial objects like greebles) either leads
to or is associated with increased selec-
tivity in the FFA (Bilalic´ et al., 2011b;
e.g., Gauthier et al., 1999, 2000; Grelotti
et al., 2005; Xu, 2005). The modularity vs.
expertise debate, however, is still ongoing
(e.g., McGugin et al., 2012; Rezlescu et al.,
2014). Therefore, a more accurate depic-
tion of the field of expert object recogni-
tion is that, researchers (including those
holding the modular and expertise views)
have been focusing a lot on the FFA due
to their research question concerning face
modularity.
It is important to note that, although
early perceptual expertise research focuses
more on the face-selective areas in order
to address the “face modularity” debate,
that does not necessitate that researchers
regard face-selective areas as the only brain
regions important for expert object recog-
nition. As an analogy, that one focuses
on studying expert object recognition does
not mean that one regards expert object
recognition as the only important func-
tion of vision. As detailed in our first point,
perceptual expertise researchers have been
tackling issues other than the face mod-
ularity debate in recent years, and have
expanded their investigations to differ-
ent domains of perceptual expertise in a
widespread network of brain areas.
CONCLUSION
Perceptual expertise researchers have been
actively investigating the neural changes
associated with expertise both inside and
outside of the visual cortex. Tackling the
face modularity debate, the majority of
early effort has been put into clarifying
the nature of the FFA. However, much
work has since been devoted to studying
the role of other high-level cognitive fac-
tors, including the effects of task demand
on both the development and expression
of expertise, the involvement of visual and
non-visual areas in expert object recogni-
tion, the effects of conceptual associations,
the way non-visual processes helps deter-
mine the pattern of visual object selective
activity, etc. In sum, there is no such thing
as a rivalry between the so-called “per-
ceptual view” and “interactive view” of
expert object recognition, and the inter-
action between perceptual and cognitive
processing has been well accommodated in
perceptual expertise research.
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